THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROUND TABLE

TWO YEARS OF WAR

A Radio Discussion by

ERNEST COLWELL, CLARENCE FAUST
SAMUEL GRAFTON, LEON HENDERSON
and FLETCHER PRATT

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Around the Round Table . . . .

ERNEST C. COLWELL, dean of the faculties of the University of Chicago, is also dean of the University's Divinity School. He received his Ph.B. degree at Emory University (Atlanta, Ga.), his B.D. at Candler School of Theology, and his Ph.D. degree at the University of Chicago. He taught at Emory University before he came to the University of Chicago in 1930. He is a regular contributor to religious journals and the author of numerous books, among which are: *The Greek of the Fourth Gospel* (1931); *John Defends the Gospel* (1936); *The Study of the Bible* (1937); *The Four Gospels of Karahissar*, Vol. I (1936); *Elizabeth Day McCormick Apocalypse*, Vol. II (1939); and editor of *A Greek Papyrus Reader* (with E. J. Goodspeed) (1935) and *A Hellenistic Greek Reader* (with J. R. Mantey) (1939).

CLARENCE H. FAUST, professor of English and dean of the College of the University of Chicago, received his A.B. degree at North Central College and his A.M. and Ph.D. degrees at the University of Chicago. Before coming to the University of Chicago, Professor Faust taught at the University of Arkansas. During the year 1940–41 he was a Stirling fellow at Yale University. Under his direction at the present time at the University of Chicago are several Army specialized training programs. American literature, especially the history of the philosophy of religion and literature in the eighteenth century, is his special field, and he is the author of *Jonathan Edwards* (with T. H. Johnson) (1935).

SAMUEL GRAFTON, writer and author of the newspaper column, "I'd Rather Be Right," has been an associate editor of the *New York Post* since 1934. He received his A.B. degree at the University of Pennsylvania in 1929 and was a writer for the *Philadelphia Record* until he joined the *Post* staff. He is a contributor to various magazines and the author of *All Out: How Democracy Will Defend America* (1940).

LEON HENDERSON, former director of the Office of Price Administration and now associated with the Research Institute of America, received his A.B. degree at Swarthmore College and did his graduate work in economics at the University of Pennsylvania. He taught economics at the Wharton School (University of Pennsylvania) and at the Carnegie Institute of Technology. Within the past few years he has been associated with the federal government in many capacities, among which were: economic adviser to the N.R.A., consulting economist to the W.P.A., executive secretary of the Temporary Economic Committee, commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and commissioner of the Advisory Committee to the Council of National Defense.

FLETCHER PRATT, author and military and naval analyst, studied at Hobart College and the University of Paris. He has been both a librarian and a newspaper writer, and he served with the War Library Service during the first World War. He is the author of many books, among which are: *The Heroic Years* (1934); *Ordeal by Fire* (1935); *Hail, Caesar* (1936); *The Navy: A History* (1938); *Road to Empire* (1939); *Sea Power and Today's War* (1939); *America and Total War* (1941); and *Land of Unreason* (with L. Sprague de Camp) (1942).

TWO YEARS *of* WAR

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MR. COLWELL: In a nation that has been at war for two years, a war already longer than any war in which this nation has engaged since the Civil War, it is natural, in reviewing its history, that we first turn to military actions, for it is at this point that the war has entered almost every home in the country. Through enlistments and the actions of Selective Service, our boys have gone from our homes into the armed forces.

In our study of two years of war we begin, therefore, with a survey of the military situation in the past two years by Mr. Fletcher Pratt, the noted military analyst.

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THE MILITARY FRONT

MR. PRATT: We in America have been at war for two years; in Russia they have had war for two and a half years; in England, for four; and in China, for something over six. What we have done in that time is to cancel the advantages gained by nations who have been thinking of war for twenty years. What we have gained is the initiative. What we have still to do is to win the war!

In that phrase is implied a degree of sacrifice to which we are yet strangers as compared with our Allies. No one in England has failed to hear the German bombers overhead, and scarcely anyone has failed to hear the sound of German bombs.

Russia and China have been invaded. Large numbers of people going about their business in the streets, like you and me, have been

killed; and, for the rest of them, food has become so scarce that a single meal of ours would support one of their families for a day.

I do not mean to imply that these specific ordeals lie before us, but, as Americans, we should not forget that they were borne by the other United Nations, in a sense, for our benefit. Those nations could do no less, but the fact remains that they have carried the burden of defense. Therefore, upon us must fall the responsibility of victory, for, however unconquerable the spirit of those nations has been, and so remains, they have spent so heavily in carrying the war to its present stage that upon us must fall the burden of supplying what is still needed both in the material and in the moral sense. That can be done only by hard fighting.

It is possible that the morale of the German people will break, but it is not likely to matter, for it is against a collapse of the home front that the Nazis specifically have prepared by ten years of active effort and twenty years of propaganda. They do not care what people think about as long as they go on working and as long as they have plenty of slaves to work for them.

Their army, the only organ of state whose opinion matters, is still very far from defeat. It is true that they can now have little hope of technical victory. They have irreparably lost North Africa and most of the Ukraine. Without those areas, the greater Germany of Nazi dreams cannot long maintain itself and cannot for very long feed itself.

But they can quite reasonably hope to attain the main objectives of their war without a technical victory by means of systematic devastations and depopulations, as is everywhere

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THE ARMY PROGRAM—TWO YEARS OF HISTORY



Source: General George C. Marshall, *Official Report of United States at War, July 1, 1941-June 30, 1943* (released at Washington, September 8, 1943).

practiced when their armies retreat. They fully expect that at the end of the war they can leave Germany as the only nation of Europe capable of standing on its feet. They feel that the exhaustion of the other European peoples will be such as to permit this, regardless of who surrenders.

It is our task to wrest that hope from them; to defeat the Nazi armies in the field *and* to smash Nazi industry in its factories. If that task is not performed rapidly, it will not really be performed at all, unless we can beat those armies into something other than the inch-by-inch retreats they have hitherto made. That is why the hardest days and the bloodiest fighting lie before us in 1944.

In our other and, to some extent, our greater war against Japan, we can expect no disintegration of enemy morale. At Guadalcanal, at Attu, at Tarawa, it has been demonstrated that every battle in that war is a battle of extermination.

Strategically, everything yet remains to be done. Unlike the Germans, the Japanese have lost nothing they cannot afford to lose. We have only stopped their advance and gained positions on our outer rampart which throw our forces and theirs into something like an equilibrium.

Our only advantage over them is that in the fighting so far we have cut down their reserves in airplanes and in certain classes of ships, which is to say again that by far the bloodiest and perhaps the longest half of this war remains to be fought.

Compared to the other nations engaged in the war, we stand, today, in every sense, only halfway into the war.

MR. COLWELL: Thank you, Mr. Pratt.

The intimate relation of foreign affairs to the conduct of war has been forcibly stated by one of the great German generals whose writings are still in the best-seller class. "War," he said, "is a continuation of the policies of peace."

That diplomacy is itself an important instrument of total war is now clear to us. We turn, therefore, in our survey of two years of war, to a discussion of foreign policy which will be presented by Mr. Samuel Grafton, columnist and associate editor of the *New York Post.*

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FOREIGN POLICY

MR. GRAFTON: The most important change that has taken place in connection with our attitude toward foreign policy in the last two years is that we have lost our fear. It has not been very long since our foreign policy was a mixture of halfhearted help to our friends and timid conciliation of our enemies. There were then two ways in which almost any foreign power could secure a measure of help from America. One was to be on our side; the other was to be against us. Either method would work, up to a point. We would give a bit of help to China because she was resisting an aggressor, and we would sell oil and steel to Japan because she was an aggressor and we felt ourselves to be in no position to take her on.

We were not seriously engaged in the business of conducting a foreign policy two years ago in the sense that a foreign policy is a definite, deliberate enterprise of encouraging our friends and isolating our enemies.

It is true that our foreign policy began to "firm up" just before Pearl Harbor. We adopted Lend-Lease in order to help the nations which were later on to become our Allies, and we experimented with an embargo against Japan. But these steps, too, like our acts of appeasement, were mere expedients. We did not adopt Lend-Lease and the embargo in order to make a brave new world. We had no conception of what sort of world we wanted. We adopted these measures in a kind of emergency spirit, only to stave off dreadful defeat.

If our enemies had paused at any point and had declared themselves content, we would have stopped, too, and declared ourselves content. The mainsprings of our policy lay in the actions of our enemies. Our own policies were merely a pale and ghostly reflection of their policies. We were forever trying to catch up, like a fat lady racing for a train and dropping bundles as she goes. We never ran ahead or even seriously tried to.

Therefore, I say that the great change of the last two years in foreign policy is that we have lost our fear. For the first time we are saying what sort of world we want and intend to help to establish; our enemies are now on the replying end.

Our plan for the Pacific is no longer a plan for mere peace—peace at almost any price—the peace that might be established on the basis of a half-dead China and a satiated Japan. Our plan for the Pacific, as the Cairo Declaration revealed last week, is the plan for a strong China, for a Japan shrunk down to her island home, and possibly for some form of international overseership for the great watery continent of Oceania.[1]

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[1] A press communiqué on December 1, 1943, stated that President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, had completed a conference in North Africa.

The following general statement was issued:

The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan.

The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This great pressure is already rising.

The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan.

They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.

It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914 and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as

Our plan for Europe is certainly not a plan for peace with a Germany which shall have eaten too much and become too fat to fight. Our plan is for forcible restraint of the aggressive impulse; it is a plan for a moral idealism outfitted with block-busters.

Of course, the greatest single specific change in our foreign policy during the last two years has been the profound alteration of our attitude toward Russia. Russia was the one great power about which we had not fully made up our minds, even at the time of Pearl Harbor.

For years, whenever Hitler was in difficulties, he could always touch what might be called our "Russian nerve" with a sharp pin, and we would leap in a convulsive and, to him, wholly satisfactory manner.

Even as recently as last spring we were in a great unclear dither about Russia. We were afraid Russia might get to Berlin before we did. On the other hand, we were also afraid Russia might stop at her own border and have no interest in going to Berlin. We did not especially like either prospect. For a time it might almost be said that our policy was that we wanted Russia to get to Germany without being there, and we wanted to be there without getting there.

All that is now changed. We have decided that we can get along with Russia without losing our character. As a matter of fact,

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Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the republic of China.

Japan also will be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.

The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.

since we came to this decision, we, and Great Britain also, have regained our national characters. The jitters of the thirties have dropped from us. We look better. Our muscle-tone has improved. Our eye is clearer.

That, too, is part of the miracle of the fact that the loss of fear has, for the first time, given us purpose and, by giving us purpose, has also given us a foreign policy. It is our side now which makes the prime statements in this field, and it is the Axis' side which has become the feeble echo.

It has been a great two years!

MR. COLWELL: Thank you, Mr. Grafton.

No area of war activity is closer to us than the home front. Strangely enough, no domestic interest causes so much discussion as the economic interest. The size of the budget, the increase in the income tax bill, the questions involved in getting an increase in salary or wages, the shortages of consumer goods, and the control of inflation are subjects on which we all feel deeply.

No one needs to tell us that these are important questions. In recognition of their importance we turn next to the domestic economic front, which we will hear surveyed by the former director of the Office of Price Administration who is now associated with the Research Institute of America, Mr. Leon Henderson.

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THE DOMESTIC FRONT

MR. HENDERSON: Two years after Pearl Harbor the miracle of American production is the outstanding feature on the domestic economic front.

Since the beginning of our defense production the American economy has doubled its physical results. This is a phenomenon

THE DOMESTIC SCENE CHANGES



Source: Department of Labor and Department of Commerce

previously unknown to industrial countries of any maturity. For example, after America entered World War I, total production practically stood still. This time we have erected a war production of seven and a half billion dollars a month, while the civilian economy also spends seven and a half billion dollars a month for goods and services.

This miracle of production is America's underwriting of such conferences as Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran. Our eighty-eight-hundred-plane production last month is a symbol of this might.

However, this doubling of production has been accomplished with a minimum of national sacrifice. In the main, it represents wider use of our resources of manpower, materials, and management. As yet, we have no real strain of the economy. Most of the elements in the community have enjoyed money prosperity. Farm income, worker income, and profits have increased. The financing of the war has been relatively easy, even if we have shown a cowardice about paying a larger portion of the cost. Our banking, transportation, and communication systems have really strengthened under heavy use. The steady gain of labor productivity of something like 2 per cent a year has continued. The nation and its people are truly in a healthy state.

But our very war prosperity creates some of the issues of the future. All elements agree that the United States must maintain a level of post-war employment which will require at least 40 per cent higher production than any of the pre-war years. High employment is our central economic issue. Planning for it cannot long be postponed.

But this country has a traditional distaste for planning. By the middle of 1944, the rate of production will start declining. This proud structure, erected to produce war goods, will begin to shrink. Its rate of shrinkage will depend on the course of the war, but one

CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Department of Commerce

day those seven and a half billions per month for war, which now stimulate the economy, will be gone. Then fifteen to twenty millions must get new jobs and get them quickly.

Already the domestic issues are clear. How shall war contracts be cancelled? How shall surpluses of plant and facilities be disposed of? How shall we continue our controls? Should the federal government continue to underwrite domestic financing? Who gets the first raw materials available for civilian production? What about

jobs for demobilized servicemen and demobilized war workers? What about tariffs? What about small business? Please note that all these will get congressional action.

No one of these major domestic issues is resolved at present so that anybody with security can make plans for the future. All of them affect not only the speed of our reconversion but the very pattern. There is no central economic policy in the nation to serve as a guide.

Ours has not been either a planned economy or a fully competitive economy. It has been mixed. Except in wartime, we have not yet found good management policies to make a mixed economy work—at a high level, that is—nor can I find in the current of thought and action today any guarantee that this country will soon have a firm national economic policy.

We shall forge one piecemeal, as I see it, by tackling problems one at a time—such problems as whether we shall use government funds to take up the slack in employment, or whether we shall rely almost completely upon private industry; whether we shall remodel our tax system to encourage business; whether we shall continue our controls to prevent post-war inflation; whether our national policies which help sustain high wage levels will be continued; whether the government will continue large-scale financing of industry and perhaps go extensively also into financing of foreign trade.

Curiously enough, as I review these domestic economic issues, the political issue forces itself to the front. Congress, as I said, must pass upon all these questions. At present there is no clear majority or any evidence that the 1944 election will give a majority control and direction. To my mind, this means delay in settling our domestic economic issues.

MR. COLWELL: Thank you, Mr. Henderson.

Battle, foreign policy, and domestic policy are not the sole areas of our living to feel the heavy hand of war. Education has been seriously and drastically affected. No more appropriate place for the discussion of education in wartime could be found than this program, the ROUND TABLE of the University of Chicago.

The University's continued activity in wartime is evidence of its faith in the primary importance of education. We turn, therefore, to a discussion of education in two years of war by Mr. Clarence Faust, dean of the College of the University of Chicago.

EDUCATION

MR. FAUST: Many of the changes which two years of war have brought into American education—such changes as the reduction of student bodies and faculties—parallel so closely the changes which the war has produced in other areas of American life that to list them would serve only to indicate that education is doing its part in the common task of the war.

I am concerned with changes of another sort—those peculiar to education and likely, moreover, to have more than temporary consequences.

Education is, by its very nature and function, concerned with tomorrow and the days after tomorrow. From this point of view, three changes in American education during the last two years are of particular, though unequal, importance.

The first effect of the war on education was to speed it up. Without in most cases changing either their aims or the methods of education, American colleges undertook to reduce the time spent in college training. The device generally adopted for this purpose was simple. It consisted of eliminating the three or more months of vacation which had traditionally been granted to college students

each year. The effect of the device was to condense the leisurely four years, commonly regarded as essential, for college to about two and two-thirds years. The plan is so obviously workable that a complete return to the wasteful pre-war arrangement seems as unlikely as it is undesirable.

But the really important changes in college education during the past few years have been a consequence, not of the initiative of the colleges, which seems to have been exhausted in devising and advertising what were called "accelerated programs," but of the demands of the Army and the Navy for the training of specialists in various phases of warfare—a demand which resulted in the establishment, under government contract, of numerous special training programs in engineering, radio, meteorology, and so on. Some one hundred and forty thousand men are now enrolled in such programs.

These special training programs are important, in addition to their place in the prosecution of the war, in two respects. In the first place, the students assigned to them by the Army and the Navy have been selected purely on the basis of their ability to master the particular knowledge and skill required. Should this method of selecting students be adopted as a principle of American education, we would have taken a long step toward making American education truly democratic. We would then have a system which would provide the maximum opportunity to each young citizen of the land and at the same time provide for making the best use of the available intellectual resources of the nation.

In the second place, the special training programs of the Army and the Navy were set up to serve certain pressing and very specific ends, and they have consequently involved radical revisions of existing college curriculums. Courses in physics, mathematics, and chemistry, in languages and geography, even to some extent in history and English, have been radically re-worked, or newly devised, to achieve these immediate and specific ends with the greatest possible directness.

The practice of shaping education to serve very specifically formulated ends which have been carefully determined by a job analysis of recognized national needs might be supposed to establish a peacetime principle for education as important as the principle of equal opportunity.

But here a very serious difficulty arises. The difficulty might be put abruptly in this way: We have no job analysis for the peace, and there are, unfortunately, few signs that American education is prepared to make one. The danger, then, is that, in the absence of a precise knowledge of what education ought in peacetime to accomplish, we shall be content to limit ourselves to ends that can be precisely formulated. In other words, the danger is that we shall

train specialists to perform limited technical tasks which can be easily analyzed but will fail to educate citizens who will be able to grapple with the complex and enormously exacting problems of the post-war world.

American colleges have learned, since Pearl Harbor, a good deal about teaching the arts required in modern warfare, but if the war should end tomorrow, it would soon be perfectly obvious that we have made little advance in teaching the arts required to establish and maintain peace. Our efficiency in war may make us aware of our inadequacy in peace.

MR. COLWELL: Thank you, Mr. Faust.

We have heard today four distinguished guests, surveying the years that followed Pearl Harbor. Mr. Fletcher Pratt asserts that we are only halfway into a tough war. Mr. Grafton assures us that we are now free to plan, since we have become free from fear. Mr. Henderson points to the doubling of production with pride and to the problems of policy-making with apprehension. Mr. Faust expresses the hope that our efficiency in wartime education may lead us to a more adequate education for peace.

Education may be our hope, as Dean Faust has implied, but most of us Americans still believe that experience is the best teacher. On this second anniversary week end of the fateful attack at Pearl Harbor, our speakers have surveyed the experiences of the American people from the fields of combat to the college classroom and from the deck of the destroyer to the floor of Congress.

One lesson we have learned partially and unevenly—that national self-interest is an unselfish interest in the sense that it is our national interest most truly only when it includes the interests of others. In foreign affairs we have learned the lesson and made a passing grade. In domestic affairs we are still on probation, with

CHANGES IN THE COST OF FOODS

1913–43



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

pressure groups and partisan leaders speaking only to the interests of the limited group. They justify themselves by speaking of enlightened self-interest, but "enlightened self-interest" is a weasel term. If we are to be selfish in the common meaning of the word, we cannot be enlightened.

If experience is the best teacher, she is also the most expensive. Her tuition charges are high and include now thirty-five hundred and seventy-three casualties on Tarawa and thousands of dislocated homes, with greater miseries to come. The school of experience is the school of tragedy.

Since the tuition is so high, the people demand an adequate return. Nothing less than government for the people is an adequate return; not government for the American, not for farmers or for laborers, not for Aryans or for Gentiles. Only if we are willing to pledge our government to the people can we say, with Lincoln, that the cause of the United Nations shall not perish from the earth.

The ROUND TABLE, *oldest educational program continuously on the air, today departed from its usual three-man, nonscript discussion in order to present a special program review of many aspects of the American scene after two years of war. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company. The supplementary information in this transcript has been developed by staff research and is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the* ROUND TABLE *speakers.*



More on This Topic

AGAR, HERBERT, "The Quest for Equality," *Survey Graphic*, November, 1942. *Says that "we are fighting against a world revolution to kill civilization."*

HULL, CORDELL, "Our Foreign Policy in the Framework of Our National Interests," *Vital Speeches*, October 1, 1943.

HUTCHINS, ROBERT MAYNARD, *Education for Freedom.* Baton Rouge, La.: University of Louisiana Press, 1943. *Analyzes the problem of what kind of education will fit youth to live a good life in a free community.*

———, "The University in War and Peace," *University of Chicago Magazine*, February, 1943. *Surveys the role of higher education in wartime.*

JONES, JOSEPH M., "A Modern Foreign Policy," *Fortune*, August, 1943. *Argues that we must achieve a foreign policy with responsibility to the source of power, the people of the United States.*

MACLEISH, ARCHIBALD, "The Moral Front," *Nation*, December 4, 1943. *States the meaning of victory as he sees it.*

MANGAN, SHERRY, "State of the Nation," *Fortune*, November, 1943. *Argues that American national unity fades as naziism totters.*

MEIKLEJOHN, ALEXANDER, "Reason or Violence?" *Common Sense*, August, 1943.

OGBURN, WILLIAM F. (ed.), *American Society in Wartime.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943. *A series of essays by distinguished authors on the changes in American life during the war.*

PEFFER, NATHANIEL, "The Split in Our Foreign Policy," *Harper's*, August, 1943. *States the problem of democratic control of American foreign policy.*

ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN D., "The Progress of the War," *Vital Speeches*, October 1, 1943. *A report to Congress on the state of the nation.*

"Twenty-five Years of U.S. Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy Reports*, October 15, 1943.

"The United States in a New World," supplement to *Fortune:* "Pacific Relations," August, 1942; "The Domestic Economy," December, 1942; "Relations with Europe," 1943; "Our Form of Government," November, 1943.

WALLACE, HENRY, "America Tomorrow," *Free World*, August, 1943. *Maintains that America has three outstanding peacetime responsibilities:* (1) *responsibility for enlightenment of the people;* (2) *responsibility for mobilizing peacetime production for full employment;* (3) *responsibility for planning world cooperation.*

What Do *You* Think?

1. What have you learned about America as a result of two years of war? Do you agree with Mr. Colwell that the nation has made a passing grade in foreign affairs?

2. What are the contributions that the Army is making to the practice and theory of American education? What kind of education should the armed forces give? To what extent should it be technical and to what extent should it have elements of liberal education?

3. What kind of plans should be made now for education after the war? Should a comprehensive educational program be set up to use the colleges and universities in the period of demobilization? Do you favor a national program after the war, giving a college education to all those who have the ability to profit from it?

4. What are the lessons of the war with relation to inflation, labor policies, production? Has the experience of the war changed your views on government, on business, on agriculture, or on labor? What has been learned about planning in a democracy? Do you think that the people of this country will be ready to apply these lessons in their economic life when the war is over?

5. How well do you think that the government has run the war on the home front? Do you think that the lessons of World War I have been applied? What failures do you find in the government's domestic policy? What successes? Are our military successes to be measured in terms of our domestic accomplishments?

6. What, in specific terms, does the war mean to you? For what are you fighting this war? For a new world order? For a new social order at home? To be able to restore the world to its pre-war status? How would you map out a program of war aims?

7. E. H. Carr says that "the essential nature of the crisis through which we are living is neither military, nor political, nor economic, but moral. A new faith in a new moral principle is required to reanimate our political and economic system." Would you agree with him? In your opinion, what are the moral issues at stake in this war?

PERMISSION OF ROCKWELL KENT

The People Say....

The following letters are representative of the views expressed by the ROUND TABLE *audience on "Grade Labeling," broadcast November 28, 1943.*

*

Fine Program

These are not the times for fairy tales, but the fairy tale of *free* competition, *free* advertising, and *free* enterprise versus the struggle against inflation made an excellent program this Sunday. Thank you for the fine program.—*A listener from Chicago, Illinois.*

*

A Cause To Fight For

I was interested in today's discussion of grade labeling. This is a cause for which we housewives, and *all* consumers, will have to fight if we really want to know what we get for our money. This is especially true of those of us whose incomes do not increase as prices rise.—*A listener from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.*

*

For Public Benefit

It is my opinion that grading of first class quality goods as "A" and "B" should be done for the benefit of the public, in order that they can depend upon purchasing a certain quality of goods.—*A listener from Quincy, Illinois.*

Informative

I enjoyed this informative program very much.—*A listener from Gilman, Illinois.*

*

Fundamental

I have just listened to your conference on compulsory grade labeling of consumer merchandise, and I want to say that I am strongly in favor of such action. It so happens that I am in charge of the material section of the fuel system of the Mosquito bomber and fighters. Our detailed specifications in regard to materials are simply fundamental.—*A listener from Toronto, Ontario.*

*

Conceal Something?

Unquestionably, if the manufacturers of standard brands object to a rigid definition of the ingredients in their products, the object can be only to conceal something. Upon this supposition, the object of concealment can lead to the conclusion that laudatory and hysterical advertisement has nothing in common with the product offered. The entire question of controversy is as simple and basic as stated

above. A perusal of the condemnation of fallacious advertising and the inferior quality, as exposed by the Pure Food and Drug Department releases which are based upon many standard brands, proves my contention. I believe this evidence and not the hailstorm of empty words and phrases of obscurantism and chicanery.—*A listener from New York, New York.*

*

Sensible

I thought that your program on grade labeling was exceptionally interesting. It was presented in a very sensible manner.—*A listener from Santa Barbara, California.*

*

Would Not Affect Advertising

I heartily endorse grade labeling. I do not believe that advertising would be lessened in any way, for, although some would have it so, we are far from the uniform income which would be the only thing that could fix a demand for one grade.—*A listener from Courtland, California.*

Meets Same Points

I am a grocery salesman who calls on grocers regularly. I often come up against the same points that you discussed today. I find discussion regarding particularly the lower margin of profit on nationally advertised brands. —*A listener from Toronto, Ontario.*

*

Vital Importance

I think that the matter of grade labeling is of vital importance at this time, and I hope that it will be brought to the attention of the general public. —*A listener from Cleveland, Ohio.*

*

Interesting

Your program on grade labeling was very interesting. As a consumer, I am for grade on as many things as is practical. I would certainly include, besides food products, clothing, shoes, and the like. I have worked in stores, and I cannot see how any reliable firm would object to such a practice.—*A listener from Verona, New York.*

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1:30 P.M. EASTERN WAR TIME

City	*Call Letters*	*Kilocycles*	*City*	*Call Letters*	*Kilocycles*
Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1470	Martinsville, Va.	WMVA	1450
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Bluefield, W.Va.	WHIS	1440	Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060
Boston, Mass.	WBZ	1030	Pittsburgh, Pa.	KDKA	1020
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Charleston, W.Va.	WGKV	1490	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Cincinnati, Ohio	WLW	700	Reading, Pa.	WEEU	850
Clarksburg, W.Va.	WBLK	1400	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Springfield, Mass.	WBZA	1030
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Syracuse, N.Y.	WSYR	570
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Greenwood, S.C.	WCRS	1450	Toledo, Ohio	WSPD	740
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400	Williamsport, Pa.	WRAK	1400
Harrisburg, Pa.	WKBO	1230	Wilmington, Del.	WDEL	1150
Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1340	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600
Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240	York, Pa.	WORK	1350

12:30 P.M. CENTRAL WAR TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1310
Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230
Dallas, Texas	WFAA	820	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790
Des Moines, Iowa	WHO	1040	Mobile, Ala.	WALA	1410
Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	Montgomery, Ala.	WSFA	1440
Eau Claire, Wis.	WEAU	1070	Nashville, Tenn.	WSM	650
El Paso, Texas	KSTM	1380	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WOWO	1190	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
Hattiesburg, Miss.	WFOR	1400	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Hibbing, Minn.	WMFG	1240	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Houston, Texas	KPRC	950	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1140
Indianapolis, Ind.	WIRE	1430	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
La Crosse, Wis.	WKBH	1410	Virginia, Minn.	WHLB	1400
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920	Wichita, Kan.	KANS	1240

11:30 A.M. MOUNTAIN WAR TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	770	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	790	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Safford, Ariz.	KGLU	1450
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1240	Yuma, Ariz.	KYUM	1240

10:30 A.M. PACIFIC WAR TIME

Bakersfield, Cal.	KERN	1410	Sacramento, Cal.	KFBK	1530
Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Diego, Cal.	KFSD	600
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Spokane, Wash.	KHQ	590
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620			

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Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1230	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Milwaukee, Wis.	WTMJ	620	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Minneapolis, Minn.	WLB	770	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	810

BY TRANSCRIPTION VIA SHORT WAVE

Anchorage, Alaska	KFQD	790	Juneau, Alaska	KINY	1450
Fairbanks, Alaska	KFAR	610	Ketchikan, Alaska	KTAN	930

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

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

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DECEMBER 12, 1943

The Four Powers Confer

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SUGGESTED READINGS

"America and the Postwar World," a special supplement to the *New Republic*, November 29, 1943.

MOTHERWELL, HIRAM, "The Three R's of Postwar Europe," *Harper's*, December, 1943.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND, "Citizenship in a Great State," *Fortune*, December, 1943.

WELLES, SUMNER, "Safeguarding Our Interests," *Vital Speeches*, November 1, 1943.

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